# The Yom Kippur Lectures Debunking Three Fallacies of Richard Dawkins September 25, 2023 Greg Coppola # Introduction This is a collection of three essays written over the Yom Kippur fast of 2023. Each one addresses a different fallacy in thinking from Richard Dawkins’ book ****************The God Delusion****************. These three fallacies are, we believe, the strongest scientific (or pseudo-scientific) arguments to come from the New Atheists. Each lecture is written from the perspective that ******************information theory****************** is ****the**** way to interpret the philosophy of science in 2023. This is 1) given the incredible success of ************************artificial intelligence************************, which we view as a branch of information theory, but also 2) because of the elegance of fundamental ********accuracy******** of information theory. In particular, we refer to Kolmogorov’s principle of **minimum description length**, recently discussed at length by Ilya Sutskever in ********************************An Observation on Generalization******************************** (Simons Institute, 2023, YouTube). This specifies that *the optimal model for a data set* is the one which can represent that data using the smallest total disk space, through a combination of 1) compressing the data as small as possible, and 2) the model being as small as possible. # Dawkins’ Boeing 747 Argument In ****************The God Delusion****************, Richard Dawkins introduces the notion of an *****Ultimate Boeing 747*****, as a metaphor for God. The name is a reference to Fred Hoyle’s argument that the likelihood of Darwin’s theory of undirected evolution would be comparable to that of a “hurricane blowing through a junkyard and assembling a Boeing 747”. In other words, the argument is that undirected evolution is unlikely, because it intuitively *feels* as as unlikely as a plane assembled by chance, which does not happen. ## Dawkins’ ***************Ultimate Boeing 747*************** This is how Dawkins explained his view it at his 2018 ********ideacity******** speech: > The essence of the argument that I want to put is that God Himself would have to be *a forteriori* even more complicated and improbable an entity [than the human race] if he is to do what is expected of him, which is to create life or to create the universe, let alone listen to prayers and forgive sins. The essence of my argument is that God is the *ultimate* Boeing 747 and that any attempt to deploy the argument from improbability—which is actually the main argument that any theist uses in favor of theism—any attempt to deploy the argument from improbability backfires—shoots itself in the foot because it can be turned on itself, it can be turned on God. (”God and Science”, *ideacity*, YouTube, September 18, 2018) > We summarize Dawkins’ argument as follows: - ***Fallacious* A*ssumptions*** - **Modeling Fallacy** - God is more “complicated” than humans, and so our explanation of God must be even more *improbable* than an explanation of humans. - **Explanation Fallacy** - In order to invoke a theory of God, we must first *******explain******* God. - ***Fallacious Conclusions*** - **God Must Lose** - Any theory of God is “a forteriori even more complicated and improbable” than any theory of humans alone. We will examine Dawkins’ two fallacious assumptions in turn, to see why this argument falls apart. ## Modeling Fallacy in Dawkins’ Boeing Argument A preliminary problem is that Dawkins is confusing different notions (or *definitions*) of the word *probability*. This kind of sloppy use of language always leads to confusion. In human language, many times two different meanings are shared by the same word. The classic example is a ****bank****, which can refer variously to a “river bank”, or to a “financial institution”. Needless to say, an argument about properties of “river banks” does not apply to a discussion of “financial institutions”. The fact that these two objects are both called “banks” is only an accident of the ambiguity and sloppiness of natural human languages, and a careful thinker will separate the two. Similarly, when skeptics of undirected evolution criticize the apparently impossible ***********probability*********** of undirected evolution, we mean that we have the specific Darwin-style model of the process of “random” evolution, and we have modeled this in the apparently unique obvious way suggested by information theory: using the **********************random walk********************** model. And, *****************within that model*****************, we have computed the probability of evolution as *impossibly* ***low***. In the case of a Creator or God, ***********in contrast***********, we ******do not****** have either a specific proposal of what **********generated********** God. This is different than the Darwinians, because they crucially ***are*** presenting a theory of how humans came to be, and the Darwinian process has a clear information-theoretic modeling. Since people who doubt evolution are ***not*** proposing a mechanism that generated God (and, they don’t need to in order to *****doubt***** random evolution), it does not make sense to assess the “probability” of God, because we have no proposed mechanism. The difference can be summarized thus: - **Darwin’s specific proposal of ***undirected*** evolution** - undirected evolution’s proponents ***are*** proposing a specific model family that generated the human race: *undirected evolution* - there is an obvious modeling of this using ******************information theory****************** - the *probability* of Darwin’s proposal, according to this modeling, is **************impossibly low************** - **we *do not* have a proposed model for God** - skepticism of undirected evolution is simply the ********negation********, or ********doubting********, of a specific theory - doubting a theory (like random evolution) does ***not*** require us to provide a competing positive theory - given the lack of a theory of how God was generated, we cannot speak of the “probability” of God existing To summarize, is incorrect to compare “probabilities” for the two cases, because only in the case of Darwin’s theory of undirected evolution do we actually have a concrete proposal for which we can estimate a probability. No one has proposed, nor needs to propose, a theory of how God was generated, so we can’t discuss the “probability of God”. This is what we call the ********************************modeling fallacy******************************** in Dawkins’ argument. ## Explanation Fallacy in Dawkins’ Boeing Argument The second aspect of Dawkins’ confusion is when he assumes that we even need to ****explain**** an “intelligent designer” (or any entity) in order to appeal to one in our scientific theory. This is a major reasoning ****fail**** on Dawkins’ part. It seems Dawkins is ignorant of one of the most famous quips in all of science, when Isaac Newton wrote ********************hypotheses non fingo********************. Let’s consider this story and its implications right now. ### Hypotheses Non Fingo One of the most memorable moments in the history of science was circa 1713 CE, when all-time great physicist Isaac Newton responded to real and hypothetical critics of his then-new theory of gravitation with one of the most famous quotes in the history of science: “*hypotheses non fingo*”. Translated to English, Newton’s response means, “I feign no hypotheses”. That is, Newton’s theory of gravitation explained the motion of the planets and of falling bodies on earth as a result of a newly postulated force Newton called *********************universal gravitation*********************. However, skeptics of Newton’s proposed “action at a distance” wanted Newton to also go on to explain **************the force of Gravity itself**************. Newton’s classic response, *********************I feign no hypotheses*********************, expressed a deep scientific truth that Newton had evidently already grasped: giving an explanation at one level of analysis, does not require giving an explanation at ***all*** explanations of analysis. This is something we now see as true in light of the assumption that ****information theory**** contains the ultimate definition of science, even though Newton did not have access to information theory, which was created around 1948, led by Claude Shannon. This is a general truth about ***all*** theories, including the question of Intelligent Design of the human race. That is, if the concept of an “intelligence” in design better explains and predicts the data, then this is a better theory than its alternative, and we do not have to “explain” the intelligence to refer to it. ### Information Theory Perspective **Information Theory** We reiterate our fundamental thesis that ************information theory************ is the ultimate refinement and expression of science. In particular, we want to appeal to the principle of **************************minimum description length**************************. As recently alluded to by Ilya Sutskever in his talk ********************************An Observation on Generalization******************************** (2023, YouTube), in the context of **********prediction********** and ***********compression***********, the overall quality of a theory is a sum of the following: - the *overall disk size* of a theory according to **************************Minimum Description Length************************** 1. the length of the data, compressed using the theory 2. the length of the theory itself Between two theories, the **better one** is the one with the *****lower***** overall disk size. **Why Newton was Correct to say *Hypotheses Non Fingo*** Newton’s position, recall, was that he did not need to *****feign***** a hypothesis about what *********************caused gravity itself*********************. He intuitively understood—i.e., long before the advent of information theory—that his theory of gravitation had added value (tremendous value, in fact) as it was, because it allowed us to predict many new things that couldn’t be predicted before. Or, in other words, his theory allowed us to better “compress” the past, because now we can exploit the patterns to store it in “compressed” form. Thus, his theory added value, even though he could not *******explain******* gravitation. In fact, we still can’t full *******explain******* gravitation to our total satisfaction, but this does ***not*** mean we cannot benefit from or use the theory of gravitation, as far as it works. # Dawkins’ “God of the Gaps” Another common Dawkins fallacy is when he refers to the ***************God of the Gaps***************. His formulation in ****************The God Delusion**************** is typical: > Searching for particular examples of irreducible complexity is a fundamentally unscientific way to proceed: a special case of arguing from present ignorance. It appeals to the same faulty logic as 'the God of the Gaps' strategy condemned by the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Creationists eagerly seek a gap in present-day knowledge or understanding. If an apparent gap is found, it is *assumed* that God, by default, must fill it. What worries thoughtful theologians such as Bonhoeffer is that gaps shrink as science advances, and God is threatened with eventually having nothing to do and nowhere to hide. (Dawkins, The God Delusion) > Summarizing his argument: - ***Fallacious Assumptions*** - **Modeling Fallacy** - Dawkins incorrectly equates gaps in the empirical *fossil record* with gaps in our *knowledge* - **Explanation Fallacy** - Dawkins incorrectly assets that positing a “God of gaps” is a “fallacy”. - Actually, we should use ******************information theory****************** and **************minimum description length************** as our only yard sticks, not these antiquated, pre-information theoretic notions. - ***Fallacious Conclusion*** - it is wrong to discount evolution due to gaps in the fossil record ## Modeling Fallacy in Dawkins’ Gaps Argument Dawkins’ first error is that he thinks that he is equating **************gaps in the fossil record************** with *************gaps in our knowledge*************. The fact is that we ********************do have knowledge******************** of the fossil record and that fossil record ********does not show transitions******** (Darwin’s Doubt, Stephen Meyer, 2013) We **do** have the knowledge. And, the knowledge is that there *are* gaps in the fossil record. These gaps are mis-predictions for the theory of evolution. This is the difference between knowing that the answer is “no” to a yes-no question, versus just not knowing the answer. Dawkins is confusing two meanings of the word “gap”. A gap in knowledge is not the same as a gap in the fossil record. These are simply two ********************************************different concepts with different definition********************************************, that share an English word form. But individual word forms are understood to be *****ambiguous***** by careful linguists, and someone who understands language does not confuse different meanings for a word. ## Explanation Fallacy in Dawkins’ Gaps Argument In information theory, once again, the best theory is described by the principle of ***********************minimum description length***********************. That is, the best theory is the one which minimizes the total disk space required to compress a data set, including both compressed data and the program. The phrase “God of the gaps” does not appear anywhere in the field of information theory. There is no reason to call “God of the gaps” a “fallacy” in 2023. This is an out-dated notion, and we should only measure by modern, quantifiable, computable information-theoretic metrics. # Russell’s Tea Pot Argument A famous argument among modern atheists is an argument about the **********burden of proof********** when it comes to religion due to the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell (1872—1970) : > Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of skeptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. (Bertrand Russell, Is There a God?) > To summarize, Russell’s argument is: - ***Russell’s Tea Pot Argument*** - dogmatic believers have proposed to believe in a God - the burden of proof is on them to prove that there definitely **is** a God, rather than on the atheist to ********disprove******** God - this is analogous to the question of a tea pot for which there are no evidence ## Misleading Nature of Metaphor The first thing that we have to understand is that this metaphor is inappropriate because of string theory: - ***string theory proposes more dimensions*** - says that there are dimensions beyond our observable 3-dimensional world - we assume that we cannot observe these dimensions - therefore, we have ***************no expectations*************** about what is going on beyond the 3-dimensional world The central hypothesis of believers in mysticism is: - ***mystics say God lives in higher dimensions*** - God and other intelligent spirits are hypothesized to live in other dimensions, beyond the 3-dimensional Therefore, this is a misleading metaphor because: - ***misleading expectations in the tea pot metaphor*** - we **do** have expectations about how tea pots look, and what it would look like to find or not find a teapot in orbit on the sun - we ******do not****** have any expectations of what happens in other dimensions than our 3-dimensional observations - a situation where we have expectations is completely different than a situation where we do not have expectations - therefore, it is misleading to use a situation we ************can conceive************ and ************************do have expectations for************************ as a metaphor where we don’t ## Incorrectness of the Analogy Aside from the misleading nature of the analogy, it is also just flat out incorrect to use this analogy, at least in terms of the question of *intelligent design*. The notion of intelligent design, which is in other words just a rejection of Darwin’s undirected evolution, is the appeal to the idea of an *********************intelligent cause********************* to explain the universe and human life, because of a judgment that Darwin-style random evolution is not possible. In other words, we are reasoning from a phenomenon, to an explanation. We are not proposing an unobservable phenomenon. Since the structure of the scenario is not the same, the analogy completely breaks down: the entire point of an analogy that the two related scenarios have an *********analogous********* structure.
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